This roundtable has gathered some very serious economists and legal scholars. I am neither; I am an active, practicing courtroom litigator. What do I have to bring to the table that could merit the attention of this group? What I bring are questions from the trenches of industry and law. After years of litigating and advising concerning the licensing of standards-essential patents ("SEPs"), I'm still short on answers, but believe I have questions that are of critical importance to the current policy debate, but that may not be apparent from an academic seat. I believe I also have some "How does it really work?" information that may be useful to you as you frame your own questions and research.
Because I claim to speak from experience, I should lay out that experience. I was dragged abruptly into the early stages of the FRAND licensing wars when I was brought in to represent Qualcomm in litigation against Nokia in 2007. This was the first case I am aware of in which parties submitted expert reports on the meaning of FRAND and how a FRAND commitment should be enforced. Since then, I have also litigated FRAND issues in two private arbitrations.
Intrigued by some of the historical record we dug up in the Nokia litigation, I later joined with Professor Geradin to publish an analysis of the development 2 of the IPR licensing rules of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI"), one of the most commercially significant standards-setting organizations ("SSOs"). Primarily we addressed not an economic or legal question, but an historical one: "What did those who developed and adopted that particular policy intend at the time they adopted it?"
In addition to litigation and historical research, my role as a legal advisor has given me numerous real-world, real-time glimpses into how companies in standardized industries interact with the standards-setting process and with licensing under FRAND obligations. Among other things, I have observed or advised concerning the following:
• The actual process of negotiating changes to SSO IPR rules;
• Decisions as to whether to participate actively in particular standardization projects;
• Decisions concerning the allocation of resources to develop the technology that will-or might-make the next standard possible;
• Decisions as to what technologies to propose for inclusion in a standard, when to support proposals by others, and when to acquiesce in the proposals of others;
• Successful negotiations for patent licenses, before, during and after the adoption of relevant standards;
• Failures to reach agreement through negotiation, leading to litigation; and
• Litigation in turn leading back to the negotiation table, and resolution.
I have watched and advised real executives obliged to make real decisions in real time. That, perhaps, provides some data points that would be hard to come by in academia.
Meanwhile, I have also been listening to and participating in the policy debates taking place internationally concerning standards-setting and the use and licensing of SEPs. Troublingly, a great deal of the economic argument that I hear has little to do with what I have seen in the real world. Where, I have wondered, are the serious economists?
Two years ago, I worked with Professor Spulber on a project, and suddenly I was dealing with a very serious economist. And I began complaining to Professor Spulber about questions far beyond the scope of that project. That began a long-running conversation. Ultimately, he invited me to bring my questions to this gathering of experts, and I am honored to do so.
At the time of this writing, I have had the opportunity to review the abstracts of the papers to be discussed at the upcoming Roundtable, and it is clear that this gathering is starting an important process. Already new questions are being asked.
More sophisticated analyses are being offered. I am hopeful that, given the importance of and interest in this topic area, many of the questions discussed during this gathering will take on a life of their own, and attract further work and publication by a wider circle of scholars. In that hope, I will put some additional questions on the willing to camp out overnight in front of the carriers' stores to buy the devices. One can always argue that the "but-for" world would be better in some way, but in terms of the objective criteria of scale of investment, speed of innovation and commercial roll-out and consumer adoption, it is difficult to imagine how much better that "better world" could be.
7 So while popular models of this industry predict patent hold-up and market-damaging royalties, the cellular industry is in fact exhibiting rude health and intense competition open to new entrants. When model and reality disagree to this extent, surely there are interesting questions to be asked. When policy prescriptions are being urged and adopted based on models that do not describe the observed facts, we are at risk of breaking rather than fixing. More than a century ago, in a context also dealing with recovery of value for patent rights, the Supreme Court cautioned that "The vast pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as the public interest, admonish us to proceed with care . . .". Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 455 (1873) . I am concerned that when it comes to standardized industries, the "pecuniary" stakes have increased by several orders of magnitude, and the "public interest" is gravely implicated, yet the world regulatory community is not "proceeding with care". Again, I'm hopeful 8 that the work done by the Roundtable participants, and the further questions they pose to the academy, will begin to change that situation.
That brings me back to questions. I must rely on trained economists to sift out the questions of true theoretical interest, and to frame them properly, but properly framed or not, I do have questions from one end of the standardization process to the other. I've gathered what seem to me the most important and interesting questions under hould a standard-setting organization's IPR policy choose to provide for IPR holders to individually disclose their most restrictive licensing terms, including the maximum royalty rates they would charge, prior to the adoption of the standard, this will normally not lead to a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).").
But as it stands today, the primary "policy objective" stated in ETSI's IPR policy that is relevant to implementers is the modest goal of ensuring that necessary licenses be "available". assume that a fundamental purpose of SSOs is to ensure equitable allocation of value among members. But I believe this hypothesis is the wrong place to start, and will not explain SSO rules as they actually exist.
Importantly, SSO rules are debated and decided by members before the creation of a standard. Agreed rules are a precondition to all the efforts, technical contributions and FRAND commitments necessary to that standard. In other words, the first and primary goal of the rules will necessarily be to enable the creation of new value that may otherwise never exist, rather than to achieve an allocation of value that has already been created. Because major SSOs are continually developing new or enhanced 11 standards, every proposed rule change should be evaluated in light of its impact on the development of the next standard.
Thus, I will suggest that an SSO should be conceptualized as cooperation between R&D innovators and market-building implementers, between direct competitors and those in vertical relationships, with a primary goal of creating value that will not exist without cooperation by this full suite of participants. As a result, I will also suggest that, when debating FRAND licensing rules prior to the creation of a standard, none of the participants would favor IPR rules that foreseeably threaten depressed returns to patentees, or conversely that would enable "hold up" of licensees. If any participant can expect to be victimized in this way, then all participants must predict sub-optimal investment by that particular participant (or class of participants), and underinvestment at any point in the chain will result in lost value.
Of course, self-interested positions might be very different if the question on the table is retroactive policy changes that will affect standards already created and investments already made. But I would think that the disinterested policymaker, or the economist, should insist on a thoroughly ex ante analysis of the existing SSO IPR rules, or any proposed changes to those rules. Coming at the question from that angle, I believe there is important work to be done to explain why SSO rules are what they are.
II. ECONOMICS OF A SUCCESSFUL STANDARD.
A complex mix of participants must be appropriately motivated if a standardization process is going to succeed, from R&D through actual standardization through commercial implementation. As we discuss changes to law or policy that would alter incentives, it would be prudent to have at least a basic model of the machine we are 12 adjusting. What categories of investment must be motivated in order for a standards project to succeed? I see a minimum of five major categories.
First, we need to motivate the investment in R&D necessary to create a solution that is better than the status quo technology. This cannot be taken for granted.
Free-riding in the form of refraining from substantial standard-specific R&D investment, or a "wait and see" approach that leaves the most risky investment to others, is a viable business strategy followed by many companies. Professors Biagi and Denicolo discuss what I'll call the "After you!" effect.
Second, we need to motivate formal participation in this SSO. This also cannot be taken for granted. Because non-members are fully entitled to practice standards and benefit from FRAND commitments, but do not themselves face any disclosure obligations, standing on the sidelines may be an option for some players in some settings. Given the anecdotal history I uncovered concerning previous threats by important members to leave ETSI over disputes about IPR licensing rules,
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Third, our standardization project needs more than mere formal membership. We need to motivate substantive and indeed intensive participation in the standard-setting process itself. As a result of my representations on cases relating to the standardization process, I have learned that-over and above the cost of R&D-standardization is itself a costly process, and in particular for innovators who must do the succeed, we need to attract the "all in" efforts of at least a number of major innovators.
Fourth, we need patentees to make FRAND commitments. Accepting these restrictions, however defined, is surely a major "investment" by the patenteeshow major depending on how the commitment is defined. Again, FRAND commitments cannot be taken for granted without regard to nature of the IPR policies and the success in building genuine consensus concerning the standard.
Fifth and finally, once we have the technology and the standard in hand, we need to motivate what I will call the many classes of "market-creation investments", including investments in product design, supporting infrastructure, development of complementary technologies, and marketing.
I understand that the real world is immensely complex, and that economic modeling requires simplification. But when I read policy arguments from important governmental sources that go no farther than arguing that royalties should be lower, because this will pass through in the form of lower prices to consumers, I fear that we have moved from the usefully simplified to the dangerously simplistic. I urge-no, I beg 14 for-an effort to develop a model of standardization and licensing that, at least to some degree, takes into account the five necessary categories of investment identified above. This is closely related to the problem of static analyses. A great deal of much-cited work about SEP licensing and hold-up relies on static models; the authors assume the existence of the technology, the existence of the standard, and the existence of FRAND commitments on all SEPs. I expect that any model of standardization that really begins "ex ante" and takes into account these five categories of essential investment will demonstrate by contrast that static models are so unrelated to the real-world operation of an SSO as to be facially useless as a basis for policy recommendations.
III. STANDARDIZATION AND RISK.
Concerns about incentives for investment are often brushed aside with a loose and sometimes unarticulated assumption that standardization provides a sweet and essentially "risk free" deal to innovators, who will be more than amply rewarded even if legal rules are changed so as to drive down royalties. As an observer through at least parts of two investment/standardization cycles in the cellular industry, I have seen something different: not necessarily the reduction of risk, but changes in the nature of risk and in the locus of risk. I will suggest that there is important work to be done here: Risks facing the post-standardization investor. Other classes of investors make their investment decisions only after the standard is adopted: product developers, infrastructure developers, marketers. As in the "but for standardization" world, these participants in the value-creation chain face the risk of horizontal competition. However, they face a reduced risk of "betting on the wrong horse", of 14 Of course, as Sprint's WiMax experience reminds us, not all standards-even standards with billions in investments behind them-achieve commercial success, so general legal principles to govern licensing of SEPs cannot assume that inclusion in a standard guarantees large returns. It is a fair question whether standardization in some other way decreases risks for R&D investors, or increases risks for post-standardization investors; I cannot claim to be comprehensive. My suggestion is simply that standardization may increase as well as decrease risks affecting needed investors, and that the affect of standardization on risks and incentives has not been studied with any rigor.
IV. STANDARDIZATION AND HOLD-UP
It is now the received wisdom that standardized industries, and the cellular industry in particular, are threatened or actually afflicted by a grave "patent hold-up"
problem. 16 Hold-up is variously defined. Most often, those using the term in the policy debate today appear to use it loosely to represent the conviction that SEP patentees are, after establishment of a standard, demanding and obtaining higher royalties than they would have been able to demand "but for" inclusion of their technology in the standard.
(Stating the "problem" this way excludes from consideration the possibility that, due to changes to the ex ante risk profile facing R&D investors, the need to induce costly participation in the standardization process, or for other reasons, it might be economically 16 See supra notes 1 and 2. Once again, when the real-world facts and the received theory point in opposite directions, it seems to me that there is important work to be done on the theory. Nov. 16, 2012) (Testimony of Timothy Simcoe) (acknowledging that he has "no evidence that the dispute between Motorola and Microsoft in this case is in fact based on hold-up" and that he "can't nail down any particular license from any company as an example of hold-up"); id at 135-36 (Testimony of Matthew Lynde) (acknowledging that "I have no basis from economic evidence to conclude whether or not patent hold-up is a real problem"). relevant standards; and more.
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C.
These hypotheses are interesting. I think they are probably genuinely explanatory. In fact, as a legal advisor I have personally seen each and every one of these mechanisms affect the course of real-world SEP license negotiations. But I do not believe that any attempt has been made to model any of them in any formal way.
It is now commonly urged that the solution to the assumed hold-up problem is for courts and regulators to enforce a rule that a patentee must seek royalties no higher than it could have obtained in a negotiation conducted before its technology became "essential" to the standard. "Ex Ante" or "In Media Res"?
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In that same paper, Professors Spulber, Epstein and Kieff pointed out that the so-called ex ante negotiation hypothesized in these arguments is in fact misnamed.
Certainly, it occurs before the implementer has sunk any costs, but it occurs after the innovator has sunk all the costs of developing the technology. This is regularly referred to as a hypothetical ex ante negotiation. It is contended that to extract any higher rate must be an exploitation of standard-induced "lock in", must be a violation of a "fair and reasonable" commitment, and may violate competition laws of some jurisdictions.
25 20 essentially all its costs, while the licensee has made at most early-stage investments. But on the other hand many licenses are negotiated after the licensee has also already made substantial investments-a "double ex post" context, with sunk costs and "lock in" all around. And finally, some licenses are indeed negotiated in a true, "double ex ante"
context, in which neither side has yet sunk its major costs: an example would be development agreements in the form of "if you succeed in developing a drug that meets the following milestones, then I have an option to take rights in it on the following terms". Is any one of these three "time of negotiation" alternatives in any meaningful sense a "truer" way of fixing the value of the licensed technology? Is there anything one can say about how these relate to the SSO members' truly ex ante goal of creating incentives that will optimize all necessary investments so as to maximize value creation?
D.
Under the heading of "hold up", let me raise a question concerning the origin of FRAND obligations. The European Commission's Guidelines On the
Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty On the Functioning of the European Union to
Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements could be read to suggest that for a patentee to demand royalties for SEPs higher than justified by an ex ante pricing model may represent hold-up and be an actionable misuse of market power even if no FRAND commitment was ever given. E.
The first question concerns royalty stacking. The FTC, echoing a number of commentators, has expressed concern that individual SEP holders, each exploiting "hold-up" power in its individual self-interest, will extract royalties that cumulatively "stack" to a level of total royalties (on cellular devices, in the most frequent example) that is unmanageable, economically excessive, and harmful to consumers.
Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking.
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No sophisticated economic theory is necessary to say that "high" cumulative royalties are not necessarily inappropriate, particularly in an industry in which manufacturing marginal costs may be relatively low, while the scale of R&D investment necessary to create enabling IPR may be high. That needs to be said in the policy debate, but it isn't interesting here. Regulatory enforcement is inherently a one-way ratchet. It puts the patentee, but never the infringer, at risk of fines. It imposes costs of defense on patentees, while the cost of enforcement is borne by the public. It may compel a patentee to license for an amount that is less than necessary to provide an adequate return on its investment, but cannot force an implementer to take a license at a rate that will deny it an appropriate return.
Carry this fact back into the license negotiation room. A great deal of theoretical work has been done modeling how parties arrive at a price through negotiation. Now, add to the mix the fact that we cannot know with any confidence what price a regulator may later determine to be the "FRAND price". If I the patentee am "too successful" in our negotiation and we agree on a price that is later deemed "too high", I
may be slammed with very large penalties. If you the licensee are "too successful" and we agree on a price that is "too low" by some criterion, you simply laugh all the way to the bank. If we fail to agree on terms, you can complain about my demands to the regulator, and the public will bear the cost of proving your case against me. I, the patentee, by contrast, have no recourse but private litigation to force you to take a license.
No one will pay my legal fees, and apparently even the act of trying to enforce my patent rights by "seeking" an injunction can put me at further risk of regulatory penalties.
Let us suppose that everyone in the negotiation room is aware of all those dynamics, as they surely are. How will this affect the negotiating positions of the two sides? What will the effect be on average "freely negotiated" royalty rates? What are the implications for returns on IPR, and for incentives in the whole standardization and standards-exploitation process? In sum, is regulatory enforcement just "one more means" of ensuring FRAND compliance, or does the presence of this new player on the field fundamentally change the game and thus the value of SEPs?
I am obliged to state my questions in the layman's language of common sense. I suspect there are more intelligent and precise questions to be asked and analyses to be done.
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VI. PORTFOLIO LICENSING
I have saved for last a question that seems to me particularly difficult.
With extremely limited exceptions, the formal modeling I have seen relating to patent licensing concerns negotiations over the licensing of "a patent".
Academics and regulators bandy about models of negotiation and pricing that involve consideration of the probability of validity, comparison of the patented technology to alternative technologies, and the cost of "working around" the patent.
Meanwhile, it is a frequent complaint that important standardized industries are "patent thickets", in which an implementer must obtain rights to innumerable patents. Surely the task of evaluating and obtaining licenses to all these patents becomes overwhelming, and extremely costly to participants? Well, yes and no.
Yes, attempting any sort of individualized evaluation and negotiation for all those patents would be overwhelmingly costly. But no, this proves not to be a crisis in the real world.
The solution is that those individualized evaluations and negotiations simply are not done. Instead, the important negotiations are for undifferentiated rights to large portfolios, each portfolio implicating a diverse array of specific technologies, and including patents ranging from the very strong to the very weak. Any sort of "incremental value" analysis against alternative technologies is conceptually almost meaningless in this context of portfolio licensing and is almost certainly impossible. In fact, it is never attempted. Empirically, I will suggest that the so-called "patent thicket"
problem may even be self-correcting: at some tipping point, industry participants deal with all those difficult patent-by-patent questions by not dealing with them, by negotiating licenses based on a different model.
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So the difficult questions: Do single-patent negotiation models bear any resemblance at all to, or cast any light at all on, portfolio licensing within patent-thick standardized industries? And, can economists develop models that describe the negotiation of portfolio licenses? And finally, can we bring such models into the discussion of the licensing of SEPs and the meaning and enforcement of FRAND obligations?
Conclusion
I have offered what seem to me to be a number of serious and I hope interesting economic questions stirred up by real-world conflicts, practices, and incentives. Based on the abstracts, I am confident that the papers that will be presented at the upcoming Roundtable will provide some important new insights concerning the dynamics of standardization and the licensing of standardized technologies. But beyond these papers, I am hopeful that one of the most important results of this gathering will be more questions. Questions clearly stated, that tempt the wider academic community to bring the firepower of theoretically rigorous economic analysis to a debate that has been too heavily dependent on ends-oriented lawyers' arguments.
